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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: THE FAIRNESS
EXCEPTION
STEVEN C. MALIN
PICTURE THIS: a Los Angeles-bound jumbo jet air-
.liner begins its approach for landing. The fog is thick
and visibility almost zero. Suddenly, a burst of wind
shakes the plane and the craft dives downward, crashing
just short of the runway. All passengers are lost and the
cause of the accident is unknown. Soon after, wheels in
the legal engine begin to move as plaintiffs in various ju-
risdictions seek recovery. The first case is tried, the air-
line held negligent, and judgment rendered for the
plaintiff. The attorneys for the airline, having lost this
first case, then look out the courthouse window to see
hundreds of plaintiffs waiting in line at the courthouse
door, carrying empty bushel baskets and waiving copies of
the first judgment.
Such is an airline-defense attorney's collateral estoppel
nightmare, and it is more realistic than it may seem.' Sim-
ply put, collateral estoppel prevents a party from litigating
an issue that he has already litigated and lost.2 Tradition-
ally, under the doctrine of mutuality, only parties to an
action or their privies could be bound by or take advan-
tage of a judgment arising from that action.3 In the above
See, e.g., Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 497 F.
Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 658 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(defendant aircraft manufacturer estopped
from relitigating issues decided in earlier action brought by different plaintiffs).
2 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
4 Id. at 326-27; see Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.,
225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912) ("It is a principle of general elementary law that estop-
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air crash situation, the mutuality doctrine would limit the
availability of any estoppel based on the first judgment to
only those parties bound thereto.4 As a result, the airline
would be free to litigate the issue of liability in all cases. 5
This doctrine of mutuality was uniformly accepted until
the 1942 case of Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust
& Savings Association,6 in which the California Supreme
Court branded the doctrine as having "[n]o satisfactory
rationalization." ' 7 According to the Bernhard court, the
main inquiry in deciding the propriety of an estoppel
should not be whether all parties in the subsequent action
were parties to the initial action (as is required by mutual-
ity); rather, the essential question should be: was the party
against whom collateral estoppel is now asserted a party to
the initial action?8 If so, then collateral estoppel should
be available to the nonparty.9 Applying Bernhard to the
scenario mentioned above, the success of the initial plain-
tiff would conclusively establish the airline's liability in all
remaining actions.
Since Bernhard there has been a steady movement by
state, 10 and now recently federal," courts to allow non-
pel of a judgment must be mutual."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93
(1942). Privity concerns the relationship between a party to an action and a per-
son not a party, but whose interest in the action is such that he will be bound by
the final judgment as if he were a party. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed.
1979).
4 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 327.
Id.
19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). For a discussion of Bernhard, see infra
notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
7 Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 894.
8 Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 894-95.
See id.
See Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970); DiOrio v. City of Scotts-
dale, 2 Ariz. App. 329, 408 P.2d 849 (1965); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344,
517 P.2d 396 (1973); Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 451 P.2d 814 (1969); Tezak v.
Cooper, 24 11. App. 2d 356, 164 N.E.2d 493 (1960); Goolsby v. Derby, 189
N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1971); Pat Perusse Realty Co. v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 238 A.2d
100 (1968); Home Owners Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448, 238 N.E.2d 55 (1968); Peterson v. Nebraska Natural Gas
Co., 204 Neb. 136, 281 N.W.2d 525 (1979); Paradise Palms Community Ass'n v.
Paradise Homes, 89 Nev. 27, 505 P.2d 596, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865 (1973); San-
derson v. Balfour, 109 N.H. 213, 247 A.2d 185 (1968); Desmond v. Kramer, 96
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mutual preclusion. Some states, however, remain
steadfast in imposing the traditional requirement of mu-
tuality.' 2 The two Supreme Court opinions on the matter
illustrate a distinction often made between "offensive"
and "defensive" collateral estoppel. 13  To define the
terms simply, when a plaintiff asserts the estoppel, it is
offensive, and when a defendant asserts the estoppel, it is
defensive.' 4 In the scenario of the first paragraph above,
the estoppel would be offensive because it would be as-
serted by the plaintiffs. Many courts have recognized dif-
ferent effects resulting from the two types of estoppel"
and have been wary of allowing its offensive use. 16 In the
seminal federal case,' 7 the Supreme Court listed a four-
factor test for lower courts to utilize when deciding
whether to grant offensive collateral estoppel; the ulti-
mate decision, however, still lies within the trial court's
N.J. Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470 (Law Div. 1967); Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 61
Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Hicks v. De La Cruz, 52 Ohio
St. 2d 71, 369 N.E.2d 776 (1977); Anco Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Swank, 524 P.2d 7
(Okla. 1974); Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1,474 P.2d 329 (1970); Richards v. Hod-
son, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971); Simpson Timber Co. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 19 Wash. App. 535, 576 P.2d 437 (1978); McCourt v. Algiers, 4
Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1956).
" For a discussion of mutuality in federal courts, see infra notes 91-138 and
accompanying text.
2 See Fisher v. Space of Pennsacola, Inc., 461 So. 2d 790 (Ala. 1984); Davidson
v. Lonoke Prod. Credit Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying law of
Arkansas); Daigneau v. National Cash Register Co., 247 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975); State v.
Speidel, 181 Ind. App. 448, 392 N.E.2d 1172 (1979); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham
Ins. Agency, Inc., 209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d 265 (1972); Barnett v. Commonwealth,
348 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1961); Duncan v. State Highway Comm'n, 147 Mich. App.
267, 382 N.W.2d 762 (1985); Pace v. Barrett, 205 So. 2d. 647 (Miss. 1968); Ed-
wards v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Clovis, 102 N.M. 396, 696 P.2d 484
(1985); Sullivan v. Beasley, 59 N.C. App. 735, 298 S.E.2d 62, rev'd on other grounds,
309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288 (1982); Armstrong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282 (N.D.
1972).
is Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979); Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329-30
(1971).
14 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326 n.4.
1., See id. at 329-30.
- See, e.g.,Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606, 614-15 (5th Cir. 1978).
17 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 322.
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discretion. 8
This comment will (1) consider the background, his-
tory, and rationale behind the doctrine of mutuality, along
with the justifications that have been offered for its de-
mise; (2) discuss collateral estoppel as applied in air crash
cases; (3) discuss the merits and costs of offensive collat-




The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
prevents a party from contesting an issue that he has previ-
ously litigated and lost.' 9 The related doctrine of res judi-
cata, or claim preclusion, on the other hand, precludes a
party from asserting or contesting a claim that he has pre-
viously litigated and lost.2 0 To illustrate, assume A, a pat-
ent holder, sues B, a competitor, claiming that one of B's
products is an infringement of A's patent. Upon trial, the
court finds the patent invalid and holds for B, the compet-
itor. If A again sues B claiming that B's same product is
an infringement, A would be barred by res judicata, be-
cause the suit is upon the same claim. If, instead, A sues
B claiming that a different product of B is an infringement
of A's patent, B would plead collateral estoppel since A's
patent had been conclusively determined invalid in the
first action.
The two doctrines differ in other ways. 2 1 As a rule, res
judicata applies regardless of whether there has been an
adversarial contest on the matter; conversely, collateral
estoppel operates only when the parties actually have liti-
i' Id. at 331-32. For a discussion of Parklane, see infra notes 110-138 and ac-
companying text.
11, See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326 n.5.
20 See id.; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). The term res
judicala, however, is sometimes intended to include both claim and issue preclu-
sion. White v. World Fin. of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147, 150 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981).
21 See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 613
(1985) [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE].
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gated the issue.22 Further, res judicata precludes only
subsequent suits on the same cause of action;23 collateral
estoppel, on the other hand, may preclude relitigation of
issues in later suits on any cause of action. 4 Finally, while
res judicata is mandatory in nature,25 collateral estoppel is
within the trial court's discretion.26
To successfully assert collateral estoppel a party must
show that the issue in question (1) is identical in both ac-
tions;2 7 (2) was litigated and decided in the prior action;28
and (3) was necessary to the prior court's judgment.2 9
Since the use of collateral estoppel in subsequent actions
is not always foreseeable,3 ° these requirements ensure
that only those issues which were fully and fairly decided
will bind the parties in subsequent litigation.
Generally, default judgments, 32 admissions during dis-
covery, 33 and stipulations prior to trial3 4 have no collateral
22 Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 353; Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g and Mach.,
Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1978).
23 Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926).
24 Id.
2-1 Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352.
26 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
27 Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892, 895 (1942).
28 Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 353 ("In all cases ... where it is sought to apply the
estoppel of a judgment ... the inquiry must always be as to the point or question
actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been
thus litigated and determined."). The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the
burden of showing what issues actually were decided. Spilman v. Harley, 656
F.2d 224, 227, 229 (6th Cir. 1981).
21 Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 353; Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944).
.," Cf Evergreens, 141 F.2d at 929 (holding that only those facts which would be
"ultimate" in a subsequent suit merit collateral estoppel effect).
11 Cf Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1977) (holding that offensive
collateral estoppel is not appropriate against the government in criminal cases
because the government frequently does not have the opportunity to fully litigate
the issues).
2 See In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1978). See generally CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, supra note 21, at 672. The initial rule was that a default judgment would
preclude litigation of each issue that would have to be resolved to support the
judgment after a trial on the merits; some jurisdictions still follow this rule. See
Kapp v. Naturelle, Inc., 611 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1979).
- FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Any admission by a party pursuant to a request under
Rule 36 "is for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by
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estoppel effect because in none of these instances do the
parties actually litigate the issue.35 The crucial factor is an
adversarial presentation.36 Thus, settlement 37 and con-
sent judgmentsM are also not bases for issue preclusion.
On the other hand, summary judgments and directed ver-
dicts39 can have preclusive effect because a judgment in
either instance is on the merits and not a product of the
parties' consent. 40 Further, the party asserting collateral
estoppel has the burden of showing which issues actually
were litigated in the first action.4 She can do this by ref-
erence to the trial record, by logical inference, or by ex-
trinsic evidence.42
Issues incidental to major matters of a suit, although ac-
tually litigated, have no estoppel effect if not necessary to
the judgment.43 Thus, minor matters which may have re-
ceived only passing attention from the parties will not un-
fairly prejudice them in later actions.44 This necessity
requirement rests on the notion that it is unfair to bind a
party to the adjudication of a particular issue unless he
had a fair chance fully to litigate and defend his rights.45
Presumably issues that were necessary to the judgment
will have had the parties' complete attention.46 The pro-
scription against affording estoppel effect to incidental
him for any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceed-
ing." Id.
• Sekaquaptewa v. McDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1978); Seay v. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists, 360 F. Supp. 123 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
" See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at 672.
See id.
'7 Standard Oil of Ky. v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 421 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1969).
.1 United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953).
sl" Simon v. M/V Hialeah, 431 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1970).
4o CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at 673.
41 Spilman, 656 F.2d at 229; Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Germanischer Lloyd,
634 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1981).
42 CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at 674; see also Russel v. Place, 94 U.S. 606,
608 (1876) (collateral estoppel will fail if the matters actually litigated are not
clear and extrinsic evidence cannot remove the uncertainty).
4. See Wilson v. Wilson, 186 Mont. 290, 607 P.2d 539 (1980).
44 CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at 675.
45 Id.
- Evergreens, 141 F.2d at 929.
findings is further justified by the fact that such findings
seldom are reviewable by an appellate court, especially if
decided in favor of the winning party.4 7
The justification for allowing collateral estoppel is four-
fold: (1) it protects parties from the expense and vexation
attending multiple lawsuits;4 8  (2) it promotes judicial
economy;49 (3) it fosters reliance on judicial action by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions;50 and
(4) it is fair, because due process entitles a party to only
one full and fair opportunity to litigate any particular is-
sue. 5' In a more general sense, when parties have liti-
gated an issue fully, spending additional time and money
repeating the process wastes judicial resources.52
Although collateral estoppel has been the point of rigor-
ous debate,53 its basic workings and objectives are seldom
questioned; it is only the related doctrine of mutuality
which draws fire.
B. Mutuality, and its Demise
The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel prevents a person
from taking advantage of a judgment to which he was not
bound.5 4 The doctrine rests upon the concept of recipro-
cal fairness; that is, it would be inequitable to allow a
party to take advantage of a judgment by which he had
17 See New York Tel. Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U.S. 645 (1934); Burchanowski v.
County of Lycoming, 32 Pa. Commw. 207, 378 A.2d 1025, 1027 (1977).
49 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
49 Id.
Id. at 153-54.
"' See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328-29 ("The broader question is whether it is
any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for
judicial resolution of the same issue.").
.'2 See id. at 348.
- Compare Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 32
(1965) and Vestal, Preclusion/ResJudicata Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REv. 27, 53
(1964) (supporting offensive collateral estoppel) with Moore & Currier, Mutuality
and Conclusiveness ofJudgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301, 330 (1961) and von Moschzis-
ker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 334 (1928) (attacking offensive collateral
estoppel).
.4 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326-27 ("Under this mutuality doctrine, neither
party could use a prior judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both
parties were bound by the judgment." (footnote omitted)).
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nothing to lose.5 5 Although it received early and continu-
ing criticism 56 and is of dwindling significance, 57 mutuality
has survived to the present day.58
1. California
The first major defector from the rule of strict mutuality
was the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of
America National Trust & Savings Association. 9 In that case,
the plaintiff Bernhard sued Bank of America alleging that
the bank had transfered certain funds without proper au-
thority. 60 The defendant bank moved to estop Bernhard
because, in a prior action against a different defendant,
Bernhard had asserted the identical claim and had lost.6 1
Justice Roger Traynor, in considering the justifications of-
fered for mutuality, opined that "[t]he criteria for deter-
mining who may assert a plea of [collateral estoppel]
differ fundamentally from the criteria for determining
against whom a plea of [collateral estoppel] may be as-
serted. '62 He stated further that while due process pre-
vents one from being bound by a judgment to which he was
not a party, no reason exists for extending this same re-
quirement to one seeking to take advantage of a judg-
ment.65  The opinion noted that many jurisdictions had
already made exceptions to the rule in cases of derivative
liability "on the ground that it would be unjust to permit
.- See Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 127; see also Ralph Wolff& Sons v. New Zealand Ins.
Co., 348 Ky. 304, 58 S.W.2d 623 (1933). The mutuality rule may be explained
historically by the fact that originally it evolved from a practice which limited es-
toppel to the parties on record. See Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Rec-
ord to ResJudicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41 (1940).
.'; See 3J. BENTHAM, Rationale ofJudicial Evidence, 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843); Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. REG.
241, 245-47 (1923); Note, ResJudicata, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 565, 570-73 (1941).
- See B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d
596 (1967) ("[T]he 'doctrine of mutuality' is a dead letter.").
.1" See, e.g., Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360, 364
(1977) (refusing to apply offensive collateral estoppel).
." 19 Cal. 2d 806, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).





one who has had his day in court to reopen identical is-
sues by merely switching adversaries." ' The court listed
as pertinent only three questions in deciding whether to
allow issue preclusion: (1) was the issue decided in the
prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the
action at hand?; (2) was there a final judgment on the
merits?; and (3) was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adju-
dication?65  Applying this test to the matter before him,
Justice Traynor found collateral estoppel appropriate.6 6
The landmark Bernhard decision remained somewhat
unnoticed until 1957 when Brainierd Currie expressed his
now famous train anomaly.67 Professor Currie proposed
the situation of a train wreck wherein fifty people are in-
jured and all subsequently bring suit.68 Assuming that the
first twenty-five are unsuccessful, but the twenty-sixth suc-
ceeds in proving liability of the defendant train, the issue
is this: based on the twenty-sixth judgment, would the re-
maining twenty-four plaintiffs be able to estop the defend-
ant from litigating its liability?69 Currie asserted that even
under the Bernhard doctrine no court would allow such an
anomalous situation. 70  He argued further that because
" Id. at 895.
"5 Id.
(lo Id. at 895-96.
67 See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 281, 281 (1957).
I' ld.
Id.
7, Id. at 286. Professor Currie commented:
If we are unwilling to treat the judgment against the railroad as [hav-
ing collateral estoppel effect] when it is the last of a series, all of
which except the last were favorable to the railroad, it must follow
that we should also be unwilling to treat an adverse judgment as
[having collateral estoppel effect] even though it was rendered in the
first action brought, and is the only one of record. Our aversion to
the twenty-sixth judgment as a conclusive adjudication stems largely
from the feeling that such a judgment in such a series must be an
aberration, but we have no warrant for assuming that the aberra-
tional judgment will not come as the first in the series. Indeed, on
the basis of the considerations noted [previously], the judgment first
rendered will be the one least likely to represent an unprejudiced
finding after a full and fair hearing.
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any aberrational judgment is as likely to occur in the first
suit as it is in the twenty-sixth, issue preclusion should be
denied in even the first action.7'
Professor Currie distinguished between the two "types"
of collateral estoppel: offensive and defensive. 72 Offen-
sive use occurs when a plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant
from contesting an issue that the defendant has previously
lost.73 Defensive use, on the other hand, occurs when a
defendant seeks to estop a plaintiff from contesting an issue
that the plaintiff has previously lost.7 4 In his article, Cur-
rie espoused the opinion that courts should view Bernhard
narrowly and allow nonmutual estoppel only in defensive
contexts - to preclude a plaintiff from merely switching
defendants after losing an initial suit. 75  Furthermore,
Currie suggested that the parties' posture in the prior suit
should play a role in the court's decision. More specifi-
cally, Currie thought collateral estoppel should not be
available against someone who was a defendant in the first
action and subject to multiple claims .7  This refusal to al-
low estoppel reflects a presumption that the defendant
frequently is disadvantaged by not being able to choose
the time or place of trial. 77 Because this inherent disad-
vantage might have prevented a full defense, Currie ar-
gued that a judgment should bind the defendant only in
subsequent actions between the same parties. 8 More-
Id. at 289.
7, Id. at 289.
72 See id. at 289-94.
7- Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326 n.4.
74 Id.
7.1 Currie, supra note 67, at 300 ("In the Bernhard case, the California Supreme
Court stated that 'it would be unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to
reopen identical issues by merely switching adversaries.' This language and this idea
are inappropriate to [a mass disaster] case.").
76 Id. at 308; see also Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (Law Div.
1965); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 3d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958).
77 Currie, supra note 67, at 303 ("In general, there is a significant difference
between the situation of a party who has lost a case after choosing the time and
place for action, and that of a party who has lost a case in which he had no control
over such factors.").
78 Id. at 308.
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over, in Currie's opinion, offensive collateral estoppel en-
courages potential plaintiffs to sit by the sidelines and wait
until a favorable judgment. Currie reasoned that this
treats the defendant unfairly because, after a successful
suit, any remaining plaintiffs may take advantage of a
judgment to which they were not bound.79 Many jurisdic-
tions, however, have rejected Currie's reasoning.80
The Bernhard decision started a trend of abandoning
mutuality.8 ' Although numerous jurisdictions82 and com-
mentators8 3 still cling to the doctrine, many now permit
estoppel in its absence.84 Those courts allowing non-
mutual estoppel generally require that the defendant have
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the previous
suit. 85 Further, some courts have limited nonmutuality to
defensive use only.86 Hesitancy to apply collateral estop-
pel offensively derives from judicial fear that such use will
delay trials and cause unfairness to defendants.87 Both
those accepting 8 and those rejecting89 offensive non-
7" Id. at 287.
.0 See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964); Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 474 P.2d 329, 337 (1970) (discussing and
rejecting Currie's reasoning that a nonparty to the initial action should not be
allowed to preclude one who did not possess the initiative in the first proceeding);
Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 559 (1962). But see Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 3d 762, 327 P.2d 111
(1958)(following Currie's multiple claimant analysis in refusing offensive collat-
eral estoppel).
81 See generally Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine In The Trenches: The Case of Collateral
Estoppel, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35 (1985).
' See cases cited supra note 12; see also Annotation, Comment Note - Mutuality of
Estoppel As Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the
Judgment, 31 A.L.R. 3d 1044, 1084 (1970).
". See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness ofJudgments, 35 TUL. L. REV.
301 (1961); von Moschzisker, supra note 53, at 299 (attacking offensive collateral
estoppel).
-4 See cases cited supra note 10.
to See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 326; Note, Nonmutuality: Taking the Fairness Out
of Collateral Estoppel, 13 IND. L. REV. 563, 567 (1980).
- See Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977);
Tezak v. Cooper, 24 Ill. App. 2d 356, 164 N.E.2d 493 (1960); Albernaz v. City of
Fall River, 346 Mass. 336, 191 N.E.2d 771 (1963).
,7 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30.
See, e.g., Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 944 (allowing offensive collateral estoppel).
" See Currie, supra note 67, at 285.
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mutual preclusion have found support in the ambiguity of
Bernhard which, by its holding, addressed only defensive
estoppel. 90
2. Federal Courts
The first significant federal case to abandon the mutual-
ity requirement was the 1971 decision of Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.91 In
Blonder-Tongue, the respondent University of Illinois
owned a patent for a radio and TV antenna. 92 In an in-
fringement action against an antenna manufacturer, a fed-
eral district court had previously held the Foundation's
patent invalid.9 3 In this subsequent action, the validity of
the patent was once again at issue. Although the patent
had been held invalid in the first action, under the estab-
lished rule of mutuality94 a change in defendants meant
that the Foundation was free again to assert the patent's
validity.95 Even though both parties to the suit argued in
favor of mutuality,96 the Court decided nonetheless that
Id. at 300-301.




14 See Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936). The Court stated:
Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an adjudi-
cation adverse to any or all the claims of a patent precludes another
suit upon the same claims against a different defendant. While the
earlier decision may by comity be given great weight in a later litiga-
tion and thus persuade the court to render a like decree, it is not
[collateral estoppel] and may not be pleaded as a defense.
Id. at 642.
, Id Interestingly, the mutuality doctrine was so generally accepted that the
defendant in Blonder-Tongue did not even raise the collateral estoppel defense until
the Supreme Court asked the parties to argue the issue. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S.
at 317-20.
- Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 317. "Though petitioners stand to gain by any
such result, we cannot urge the destruction of a long accepted safeguard for pat-
entees merely for the expediency of victory." Brief for Petitioner at 12, Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). The
government as amicus curiae, however, urged modification of the Triplett rule. Brief
for United States at 7, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
considerations of judicial efficiency must prevail over ab-
stract concepts of fairness9 7 and abandoned the mutuality
rule in patent validity cases.98 To buttress its decision, the
Court observed that where the patentee was a plaintiff in
the prior suit and, therefore, chose the time and place of
trial, he presumably prepared to litigate the issue fully. 99
This justification, one should note, applies solely in the
context of defensive estoppel. 0 0
The Court also observed that the patentee's statutory
presumption of validity would obtain in each successive
infringement action. 10 ' As a result, prospective defend-
ants often decide that paying royalties under a license or
other settlement is preferable to the costly burden of con-
testing the patent. 0 2 Again, however, this reasoning is
valid only in a defensive context. In an offensive situa-
tion, the plaintiff is not forced into any litigation and is
not, by definition, the subject of vexatious suits.10 3 Thus,
the Court's justification for abandoning mutuality, that a
plaintiff "should not be allowed to harass others on the
basis of an invalid claim,"10' 4 is inapposite when a non-
party plaintiff seeks to offensively estop a party defendant.
Blonder-Tongue did represent a departure from the strict
in Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329.
I ld. at 350.
' Id. at 332. The Court stated:
[W]e are considering the situation where the patentee was plaintiff
in the prior suit and chose to litigate at that time and place. Presum-
ably he was prepared to litigate and to litigate to the finish against
the defendant there involved .... [T]here is no reason to suppose
that plaintiff patentees would face either surprise or unusual difficul-
ties in getting all relevant and probative evidence before the court in
the first litigation.
Id.
.... See id. Since, at least initially, the plaintiff gets to choose the forum of suit,
he cannot realistically be heard to complain about it. See id.
lo, Id. at 335-38.
102 Id.
"Is Cf Montana, 440 U.S. at 147 (stating one result of collateral estoppel to be
the avoidance of "the expense and vexation of multiple lawsuits").
- Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 339-40 ("[A] patentee, having been afforded the
opportunity to exhaust his remedy of appeal from a holding of invalidity, has had
his day in court and should not be allowed to harass others on the basis of an
invalid claim.").
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rule of mutuality; 10 5 the opinion, however, was narrow in
scope'06 and expressly refused to pass upon the desirabil-
ity of offensive preclusion. 0 7 While some lower courts
extended Blonder- Tongue's reasoning beyond its strict
terms, 08 others construed it narrowly to apply only to de-
fensive cases. 109 With the changing legal environment and
ever-increasing congestion in the federal court system,
the time was ripe in 1978 for the Court to rule upon the
merits of offensive collateral estoppel; this it did in Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. " 10
In Parklane, respondent Shore brought a shareholders'
class action in federal district court for damages and other
relief against the Parklane Hosiery Company (the "Corpo-
ration") alleging that it had issued a materially false and
misleading proxy statement."' But before the action
came to trial, the Securities and Exchange Commission
sued the same defendant on essentially the same
grounds" l 2 and won."l 3 Subsequently, Shore asserted that
the Corporation was collaterally estopped from relitigat-
ing the issues which it had lost in the SEC suit. "4 Such
use of offensive estoppel, however, had to that time not
received official Supreme Court approval.
The Parklane Court began its analysis by restating two
of the justifications for the doctrine of collateral estoppel:
, Id. at 350 (" [We conclude that [the mutuality doctrine] should be overruled
to the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing a charge of infringe-
ment of a patent that has once been declared invalid.").
,o, Id.; see also id. at 327 (stating issue to be "whether mutuality of estoppel is a
viable rule where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent once a fed-
eral court has declared it to be invalid.").
107 Id. at 330.
,08 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 298-299
(1982).
,, Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-31.
lo 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
ill Id. at 324.
1"2 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
113 Id. at 487.
114 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 325. Also at issue in Parklane was whether "a party who
has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to
litigate in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subsequent jury
trial of these same issues of fact." See id.
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(1) it protects litigants from the burden of relitigating an
identical issue with the same party or his privy; and (2) it
promotes judicial economy by preventing "needless" liti-
gation. 1 5 Although the Court interpreted its Blonder-
Tongue holding as having addressed the "broader ques-
tion" of whether a party should be allowed more than one
full and fair opportunity to litigate," 6 the Court recog-
nized several reasons why courts should distinguish be-
tween offensive and defensive use." 7 First, the Court
offered, offensive preclusion does not promote judicial ef-
ficiency as defensive use does." 8 Defensive estoppel pre-
vents a plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely
switching defendants. As a result, defensive preclusion
gives a plaintiff strong reason to join all possible defend-
ants in the first action." 9 On the other hand, offensive
estoppel creates precisely the opposite effect. Since in
this context a plaintiff benefits from a previous judgment
without being bound by it,' 20 he has every incentive to de-
lay his litigation in the hope that the first action will pro-
duce a favorable judgment.' 2' Permitting offensive
collateral estoppel, then, would likely increase rather than
decrease the total amount of litigation because potential
plaintiffs will have nothing to lose and everything to gain
by not joining the initial suit. 122
The Court offered a second reason for disallowing of-
fensive issue preclusion: unfairness to the defendant.12 1
Although not discussing the basic inequity of allowing a
, Id. at 326. Interestingly, although not mentioned by the Court, the first-
cited justification is not valid in the offensive context since the only party who
would relitigate the issue (i.e., the defendant) would do so by choice. See id.
11r Id. at 327-28.
",7 Id. at 329-31 (stating that the application of offensive collateral estoppel may
result in inefficiency and unfairness).
11 Id. at 329.
119 Id. at 329-30.
120 Id. at 327 n.7. "It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding
on a litigant who was not a party or privy and therefore has never had an opportu-
nity to be heard." Id.; see Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329.
121 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 330-31.
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plaintiff to take advantage of a judgment in which he had
nothing at risk, 24 Justice Stewart listed three instances in
which allowing such estoppel would be unfair to the de-
fendant. First, in situations where the amount in contro-
versy in the original action is small or subsequent suits are
not foreseeable, the defendant will have little incentive to
litigate the specific issue fully.' 25 Second, collateral estop-
pel may be unfair to a defendant if there exist prior incon-
sistent judgments. 26  Finally, a court should refuse
preclusion if the second action affords the defendant pro-
cedural opportunities unavailable in the first suit that
could readily cause a different outcome. 127
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Court decided
"not to preclude" the use of offensive collateral estoppel,
but rather to allow it at the discretion of the district
courts. 12 8 As a general rule, the Court opined, trial courts
should not allow offensive estoppel in cases where the
plaintiff could easily have joined in the first action or
where its application would, for the reasons previously
discussed, be unfair to the defendant. 29 Applying this
test, the Court permitted estoppel in the case before it.
First, respondent Shore could not have joined in the ini-
tial action because it was injunctive in nature and brought
by the SEC. 130  Furthermore, allowing issue preclusion
124 See Note, supra note 85, at 593-94.
,2-. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330; see Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines,
Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1969); Evergreens, 141 F.2d at 927.
1"1 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330; Currie, supra note 67, at 304; RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(4) (1982).
,27 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331. "The problem of unfairness is particularly acute
in cases of offensive estoppel, however, because the defendant against whom es-
toppel is asserted typically will not have chosen the forum in the first action." Id.
at 331 n.15.
1' Id. at 331.
[T]he distinct trend if not the clear weight of recent authority is to
the effect that there is no intrinsic difference between "offensive" as
distinct from "defensive" issue preclusion, although a stronger
showing that the prior opportunity to litigate was adequate may be
required in the former situation than the latter.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299-300 (1982).
"" Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.
Id. at 331-32. The Court cited 15 U.S.C. § 78u (g), which prohibits consoli-
was not unfair to the defendant because the seriousness of
the allegations made in the SEC's complaint and the fore-
seeability of private suits which routinely follow SEC ac-
tions gave the Corporation every incentive to litigate
fully.' 3' Moreover, the remaining two elements in the
Court's fairness test were satisfied: the judgment in the
initial action was not inconsistent with any prior judg-
ments and the defendant had no procedural opportunities
in the subsequent action unavailable in the first suit that
were likely to have caused a different result. 132 The Court
concluded by stating that because the Corporation had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior action, the
"contemporary law of collateral estoppel" demanded that
it be estopped from relitigating the previously decided
issue. 133
The Parklane Court, by espousing a separate test for of-
fensive collateral estoppel situations, implicitly refused to
extend Blonder- Tongue's analysis beyond the defensive con-
text. 134 Thus, merely a showing that a party had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate, which is sufficient to permit
estoppel against a plaintiff,131 is insufficient, by itself, to es-
top a defendant in a subsequent action. 36 The Court thus
dation of a private action with an SEC action without SEC consent. Id. at 332
n.17.
Id. at 332.
After a 4-day trial in which the petitioners had every opportunity to
present evidence and call witnesses, the District Court held for the
SEC. The petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which affirmed the judgment against them. More-
over, the petitioners were already aware of the action brought by the
respondent since it had commenced before the filing of the SEC
action.
Id. at 332 n.18.
1 I. d. at 332.
,- Id. at 332-33. The Court did not cite any examples of the "contemporary
law of collateral estoppel." See id.
1.44 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329; see also Gershonowitz, Issue Preclusion: The Return
of the Multiple Claimant Anomaly, 14 UNIv. BALT. L. REV. 227 (1985); supra notes 72-
79 and accompanying text.
See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313.
Gershonowitz, supra note 134, at 239 ("Under Parklane, although a full and
fair opportunity to litigate is necessary, it is never a sufficient justification for of-
fensive use of collateral estoppel.").
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expressly recognized the difference between the two types
of preclusion and created a stricter rule for offensive cases
to curb possible abuse.
The rationale of Parklane can be stated as follows: (1)
judicial economy requires that any particular issue be liti-
gated only once; 37 and (2) "fairness" commands only
that a party be given one chance to litigate fully any par-
ticular matter.3 8 As discussed below, 3 9 these justifica-
tions are not based in sound judicial objectives, and
further, are outweighed by competing considerations.
3. The Restatement
The Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, although sim-
ilar in many respects to Parklane,'40 declines to distinguish
among the different uses of collateral estoppel.' 4 1 Section
29, following Bernhard and Blonder-Tongue, would disallow
preclusion if the party to be estopped lacked a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the first action. 142 This section
also separately recognizes "other circumstances" that jus-
tify an opportunity to relitigate an issue.143 Among these
factors are those espoused in Parklane: (1) whether the
precluding party could have joined in the prior suit; (2)
whether the subsequent action was not foreseeable or the
original party did not have a full incentive to litigate; (3)
the existence of prior, inconsistent determinations; and
(4) procedural opportunities available in the subsequent
1.17 439 U.S. at 326; see Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328-29 ("In any lawsuit where
a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete
defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a
prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources.").
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326; see Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328.
' See infra text accompanying notes 183-209, 216-227.
,4,, See generally Gershonowitz, supra note 134, at 238. Both authorities require
that the prerequisites of mutual collateral estoppel be satisfied before nonmutual
estoppel is granted, grant discretion to trial courts, and consider potential unfair-
ness to defendants and negative effects on judicial economy. Id.
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299 (1982).
J42 Id. at 291.
143 Id. (offensive collateral estoppel will not obtain if "other circumstances jus-
tify affording [the party] an opportunity to relitigate the issue").
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action unavailable in the initial action. 144 These factors
are considered regardless of the posture of the parties. 45
Thus, under the Restatement rule, a person seeking to in-
voke defensive collateral estoppel would have a more dif-
ficult time than under the Blonder-Tongue test because the
only showing required there is a full and fair opportunity
to litigate.
Section 29 also lists other factors which militate against
estopping a party: (1) if allowing the preclusion would be
incompatible with the remedy scheme involved; 46 (2) if
the relationship of the parties changed or the initial ver-
dict was based upon a compromise; 47 (3) if allowing the
estoppel would complicate matters or would prejudice the
interests of another party; 4 ' or (4) if the issue is one of
law.' 49 These factors, like those above, apply equally to
144 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30, 331. The Court viewed the sufficient incentive,
inconsistent judgments, and procedural opportunities factors as elements in an
ultimate question of fairness to the defendant. Id. at 331. Thus:
The general rule [is] that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have
joined in the earlier action or where, either for the reasons discussed
.. or for other reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would
be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of
offensive collateral estoppel.
Id.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982); see also id. reporter's
note at 299 (stating that the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" rule has gained
general acceptance).
146 Id. § 29(1). "[I]f a statute provides that a determination is limited to the
action in which it is made, or that it is to be treated in subsequent actions as only
prima facie evidence of the facts involved, the determination should not be given
preclusive effect." Id. § 29(1) comment c.
147 Id. § 29(5). "Particularly where the issues have been tried to a jury, the cir-
cumstances may suggest that the issue was resolved by compromise or with more
or less conscious reference to such matters as insurance coverage or the litigants'
relative financial position." Id. § 29(5) comment g.
-,, Id. § 29(6). "[Slince the primary consideration in administering the rule of
preclusion is fairness rather than consistency, it is inappropriate to invoke preclu-
sion where it will embarrass or hinder a party who has not yet had his day in
court." Id. § 29(6) comment h.
,41 Id. § 29(7). A court should not allow preclusion if"[t]he issue is one of law
and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose oppor-
tunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was based."
Id. For a discussion of the difference between issue preclusion and stare decisis,
see CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at 609-610.
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defensive and offensive assertions. 50  Generally, Section
29 closely resembles the Parklane test: like Parklane, it re-
quires that the terms of mutual collateral estoppel be sat-
isfied before considering nonmutuality, grants discretion
to trial judges, and considers potential unfairness to de-
fendants and effects on judicial efficiency.' 5 '
The major distinction between Parklane and the Re-
statement is upon whom the burden falls to show the
presence or absence of any circumstances requiring reliti-
gation. Although it is not clear from either Parklane or the
Restatement, one commentator has suggested that the
Restatement requires the defendant to show the particu-
lar circumstances requiring relitigation, while Parklane re-
quires the plaintiff to show that granting the estoppel
would not be unfair to the defendant. 52 As mentioned
above, while the Supreme Court has a separate rule for
each type of estoppel 5 3 the Restatement makes no such
distinction. 154 Parklane justifies its special rule for offen-
See supra note 145.
' ' Gershonowitz, supra note 134, at 238.
15 Id. at 240-41. "Under the Restatement . . . the defendant must show the
existence of some circumstance requiring relitigation. . . . [T]he Court [in Park-
lane, however,] showed that along with the opponent's previous full and fair op-
portunity to litigate, a party seeking estoppel must demonstrate the nonexistence
of circumstances which might require relitigation." Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OFJUDGMENTS § 29 requires: (1) the existence of the conditions for mutual estop-
pel; (2) that the defendant have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the
initial action; and (3) a lack of showing by the defendant of circumstances that
justify relitigation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). Parklane,
in contrast, places the burden on the plaintiff to prove that offensive issue preclu-
sion would not be unfair to the defendant. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331-32; see Ger-
shonowitz, supra note 134, at 241 n.83. According to one commentator:
The difference between Parklane and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS is best illustrated by what happens when a court senses
some general, unarticulated unfairness. If the Restatement rule ap-
plied, estoppel would be granted because the defendant must show a
good reason to relitigate. Under Parklane, however, where the plain-
tiff must show the absence of reasons to relitigate, estoppel would
probably be an abuse of discretion.
Gershonowitz, supra note 134, at 241 n.83; see 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 4465 (1961).
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329.
, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299
(1982).
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sive use by the judicial inefficiency and "unfairness to de-
fendants" rationale.'5 5 The Restatement, although it
makes no distinction, concedes that unfairness is more
likely with offensive use, and thus, courts may require a
greater showing that the defendant's opportunity to liti-
gate in the prior action was adequate. 56
II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN AIR CRASH CASES
In Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 157 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York uti-
lized the New York rule, similar to Bernhard, which re-
quired for the granting of offensive collateral estoppel (1)
an identity of issues and (2) that the defendant have had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the first action. 58 The
plaintiff in Georgakis sued for personal injuries arising out
of the June 24, 1975 crash of Eastern's Flight 66 at John
F. Kennedy Airport. 5 9 Eastern asserted that the flight in
question was the U.S. leg of an international journey and
it therefore fell within the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention. 60 The plaintiff moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that a previous action by another
plaintiff involved in the crash had conclusively determined
this issue against the airline.' 6' The court held that (1)
because the plaintiffs in both actions had similar itinera-
ries, the issues in each action were identical, and (2) East-
ern had fully and fairly litigated its defense. 62 As a result,
offensive preclusion was permitted. 63
439 U.S. at 329-30.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note at 299-300
(1982).
157 512 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
-8, For a discussion of the Bernhard rule, see supra notes 59-66 and accompany-
ing text.
,s. Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 330.
' Id. at 330-31.
Id. at 330, 333. Interestingly, the case used for estoppel by the plaintiff was
reversed on the ground, inter alia, that the Warsaw limits did apply. See Stratis v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 682 F.2d 406, 409-14 (2d Cir. 1982).
162 Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 334.
,1 id. at 335.
1988] 979
980 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
The case of Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. 164 arose
from the June 13, 1971 crash of a U.S. Air Force C-135B
aircraft which killed all twenty-four persons on board. 65
Various plaintiffs brought actions against the United
States and LTV, which the court consolidated for trial on
liability.' 66 The court later severed two of the actions and
found the defendants liable on the remaining claims. 167
The two plaintiffs severed from the suit subsequently in-
tervened and, based on the first consolidated suit, moved
to collaterally estop the defendants from contesting their
liability.' 68 The court applied the Parklane analysis' 69 and
allowed the preclusion since: (1) the plaintiffs could not
have joined the first action and, in fact, were severed by
the court sua sponte; (2) the defendants had every incentive
to litigate in the first action; (3) there were no inconsistent
prior judgments; and (4) there were no procedural differ-
ences between the two actions. 70
In Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircrafit Corp. 171
the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia applied the Parklane offensive collateral estoppel anal-
ysis to the question of whether the forces and conditions
associated with the air crash of a Lockheed C5-A were suf-
ficient to cause injury to an infant passenger. 72 A single
jury in two earlier cases had decided this issue in the af-
firmative. 7M The court found that: (1) the plaintiff could
not have joined the prior action due to Lockheed's consis-
tent opposition; (2) because all of the plaintiffs' claims
were filed simultaneously and Lockheed was aware of the
possible collateral estoppel effect of the first action, it had
fully litigated its defense; (3) there were no inconsistent
1 4 513 F. Supp. 335 (C.D. Cal. 1981).




I' For a discussion of Parklane, see supra notes 110-138 and accompanying text.
170 Stoddard, 513 F. Supp. at 337-38.
17, 497 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1980).
172 Id. at 315-16.
17-1 Id. at 316.
prior judgments; and (4) there were no procedural advan-
tages in the subsequent case.' 74 The court, therefore, or-
dered the defendant not to reargue the issue in any of the
remaining suits. 75 Upon appeal, however, the District of
Columbia Circuit vacated the pretrial order 176 on the
grounds that (1) there was not a sufficient identity of is-
sues, 7 7 and (2) the lower court's order was not accurately
tailored to the issue actually decided in the first suit. 78
The above cases indicate that the mutuality doctrine no
longer serves as an absolute bar to offensive issue preclu-
sion. While lower courts strictly apply the Parklane criteria
in air crash cases, the ultimate decision is still within their
discretion. 79 And, as with any other discretionary tool,
such decision is subject to abuse. A further discussion of
the rationale behind offensive collateral estoppel will pro-
vide insight into the desirability and equity of its
existence.
III. OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL - AN ANALYSIS
Courts have recited the following justifications when al-
lowing estoppel in the absence of mutuality: (1) the pro-
tection of parties from the expense and vexation that
inevitably attend multiple lawsuits; (2) the conservation of
scarce judicial resources; and (3) the encouragement of
confidence in judicial finality by the avoidance of inconsis-
tent judgments. 8 0 A fourth reason often espoused by
courts that allow offensive estoppel is the notion that
"fairness" affords a party only one chance fully to litigate
any particular matter. 8" Each of these bases merits indi-
174 Id. at 317-18.
1- Id. at 319.
1'7 Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
177 Id. at 852.
178 Id.
179 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.
- See Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; see also CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at
678.
i" Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
865 (1950) ("[A] party who has had one fair and full opportunity to prove a claim
and has failed in that effort, should not be permitted to go to trial on the merits of
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vidual scrutiny.
A. Vexation of Multiple Suits
An oft-cited justification for the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is the protection of parties from the "expense
and vexation attending multiple lawsuits."'' 82 When a par-
ticular fact is determined in an action, it is considered un-
fair to the prevailing party to allow the losing party to
again contest that issue in a subsequent suit between
them. Thus, the focus is upon unfairness to the prevailing
party. In the scheme of nonmutual preclusion, however,
the prevailing party is not involved in the second action;
rather, it is a nonparty who seeks to estop the losing party
from the prior action. Thus, because the estoppel does
not involve the earlier prevailing party, the "multiple
suit" justification is inapposite. Clearly, because this is his
first contact with the suit, the nonparty is not burdened by
having to litigate the particular issue. Moreover, neither
is the party to be estopped burdened since he freely
chooses the relitigation.
B. Conservation of Judicial Resources
Another frequently cited reason for allowing non-
mutual collateral estoppel is the conservation of judicial
resources. 18 3 Justice White, in discussing defensive estop-
pel in Blonder-Tongue, argued that there is an arguable mis-
allocation of resources whenever a defendant, because of
the mutuality principle, is forced to present a full defense
on the merits to a claim that the plaintiff has already liti-
gated and lost in a prior action. 8 4 He argued further that
any additional time spent by a defendant that could have
been avoided through preclusion diverts the defendant's
that claim a second time... unless some overriding consideration of fairness ...
dictates a different result .... ).
182 See, e.g., Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54.
183 See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 348 ("Even accepting respondents' characteri-
zation of [the time saved by allowing collateral estoppel] as de minimis, it is clear
that abrogation of [the mutuality rule] will save some judicial time .....
184 Id. at 329.
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time and money from alternative uses. t s5
This reasoning, however, was not carried forward to the
Court's analysis of offensive estoppel in Parklane.'a6 The
Parklane Court initially distinguished Blonder-Tongue be-
cause of its defensive posture,18 7 and then expressly rec-
ognized the inefficiencies inherent in allowing offensive
preclusion.18 8 Parklane raised the concern that because a
plaintiff will have "everything to gain and nothing to lose"
by waiting for a favorable judgment, the inevitable result
will be delay and judicial waste.' 8 9 In contrast, defensive
use promotes efficiency because a plaintiff, knowing he
will be estopped in future actions, has a strong incentive
to join all potential defendants. 90 Thus, the difference
between the two applications lies in whether the party as-
serting the estoppel has the power to join other parties
related to the suit. 19
Because a plaintiff has control over whom he sues,192 he
will likely join all parties who could possibly take advan-
tage of his judgment. A defendant, on the other hand,
has little chance of adding potential plaintiffs to the ac-
tion.19 3 Further, a court will join a plaintiff sua sponte only
if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be afforded
among those already parties or (2) the plaintiff has an in-
I'f ld.
'" Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329 ("In both the offensive and defensive use situa-
tions, the party against whom estoppel is asserted has litigated and lost in an ear-
lier action. Nevertheless, several reasons have been advanced why the two
situations should be treated differently.").
187 Id. ("The Blonder-Tongue case involved defensive use of collateral estoppel
.... The present case, by contrast, involves offensive use.
1- Id. at 329-30.
1- Id. at 330; cf. id. at 331 ("The general rule should be that in cases where a
plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action .. .a trial judge should not
allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.").
Id. at 329-30; Gershonowitz, supra note 134, at 234.
See Note, supra note 85, at 584-87.
'" See FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Although it is within a district court's discretion to
consolidate actions against a common defendant, id.; see, e.g., Arnold v. Eastern
Airlines Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 1982), such power is limited to only
those actions being prosecuted within a common district. Swindell-Dressler Corp.
v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1962).
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terest in the suit such that disposition of the matter in his
absence may prejudice that interest or subject present
parties to multiple liability. 94 In the air crash situation, a
court would seldom forcibly join a plaintiff since (1) relief
can be granted adequately through separate trials, and (2)
one plaintiff's victory would not prejudice the interests of
the remaining plaintiffs.' 95 The defendant, because he
has no real control over the parties to the action, 196 thus
cannot substantially affect "judicial economy. "197
Furthermore, if a defendant knows that a judgment in a
particular action might be used conclusively to prove his
liability in subsequent actions, the defendant will assert
his defense with this potential liability in mind. 98 Thus,
the defendant may put on a much greater defense in the
initial action than he otherwise would have.' 99 The result
is twofold: First, a plaintiff expecting merely a small de-
fense may lose an action unfairly because of the great eco-
nomic resources used by the apprehensive defendant. ° °
Second, there is also an "arguable misallocation of re-
sources" in the first suit because the fear of subsequent
estoppel effect will artificially inflate the amount of work
put forth by the defendant. 20  The inefficiencies of this
scenario would not apply in the defensive context, how-
-4 FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
m', Cf FED. R. Civ . P. 23, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to
Rules (commenting that ordinarily a mass disaster is not appropriate for a class
action).
"1i See Currie, supra note 67, at 287 ("In the relatively rare instances in which it
is possible for the defendant to force consolidation of all claims arising from a
single occurrence in one proceeding, he normally fights for the right to do so.").
See generally Note, supra note 85, at 575 n. 79. A defendant cannot join plaintiffs in
federal courts except by necessary joinder if the court rules that the plaintiff is a
"party to be joined if feasible," FED. R. Civ. P. 19; by interpleader in situations
involving exposure to double liability, FED. R. Civ. P. 22; by consolidation of
claims in the same jurisdiction, FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a); or by declaratory judgment,
if permitted, FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
,,7 Note, supra note 85, at 575.
"' See Moore & Currier, supra note 83, at 310; Note, supra note 85, at 572.
': R. FIELD AND B. KAPLAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 859 (3d ed. 1973).
oo See Note, supra note 85, at 572-73.
201 See id. at 583 ("Litigants who anticipate future suits tend to litigate more
vigorously to avoid losing an issue which they may later be precluded from
relitigating.").
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ever, because the plaintiff, instead of prosecuting his
claim with inflated vigor, would simply join all possible
future defendants. °2
The efficiency argument in favor of offensive non-
mutual estoppel is further undermined by the fact that de-
fendants against whom the estoppel is asserted will
"waste judicial resources" in fighting application of the
estoppel. °s Under the Parklane test, for example, the de-
fendant will contend that the plaintiff could easily have
joined in the initial action.2 °4 And, this "easily have
joined" question would occur in each subsequent action
in which the defendant has a judgment at stake. 05 As a
result, the court must take time to consider affidavits, dep-
ositions, and other evidence relating to the first judgment
merely to rule on the estoppel issue. 0 6 The defendant, in
addition, will attempt to prove that to preclude him would
be unfair under one or more of the Parklane factors. 7
Obviously, the amount of procedural litigation a party
will engage in to avoid estoppel will vary with the parties
and circumstances. It would be somewhat naive, however,
to assume that a defendant with many subsequent judg-
ments at risk will simply accept his loss in the first suit and
submit to estoppel in each future suit.2 08 The defendant,
in actuality, will likely defend against the estoppel with ex-
202 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30.
20,.2 Note, supra note 85, at 573 ("Rather than engage in relitigation of issues,
parties will contest the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel . . . The
focus of litigation thus shifts from the merits to procedural opportunity when
nonmutual collateral estoppel is asserted .... ").
2 M See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331 (ruling that where plaintiff could easily have
joined the initial action offensive collateral estoppel should be denied); cf. RE.-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982)(denying collateral estoppel if
plaintiff "could have effected joinder in first action"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 29 comment e (1982)(collateral estoppel should be denied where
the party asserting it "might ordinarily have been expected to join" or "could
reasonably have been expected to intervene" in the prior action).
20-N Note, supra note 85, at 573-74.
2W0 Id.
207 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31; see supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
2... See Note, Collateral Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 730
(1967)("It is arguable ... that because there is no certainty in the application of
the full-and-fair-opportunity test nearly every litigant against whom collateral es-
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actly the amount of economic resources that he otherwise
would have allocated to contesting the estopped issue. As
above, this third countervailing consideration would not
exist in a defensive context because a plaintiff, sensing
subsequent collateral estoppel battles that even if won
would only give him the right to relitigate an issue, would
join all potential parties who could take advantage of a
judgment decided adversely to him.20 9
C. Inconsistent Judgments
A third justification for collateral estoppel is that it en-
courages confidence in the finality of judicial decisions by
avoiding inconsistent judgments.2 1 ° If courts prohibit
parties from relitigating identical issues in different suits,
there will exist only one finding on any particular point.
Because specific findings will never be contradicted, the
argument goes, the court system will appear effective as a
"truth finder." Other considerations, however, are read-
ily apparent.
First, the primary purpose of our judiciary is not to en-
gender the public's confidence but rather to resolve dis-
putes between parties. l Second, the rendering of
multiple judgments inherently exposes any aberrational
findings. 21 2 For example, if a defendant won ninety-five
out of one hundred suits arising from a common set of
facts (such as an air crash), one could reasonably assume
that the defense was the "better" position and that "jus-
toppel is asserted will seek to show that he would be prejudiced by a preclusion of
his claim.").
.... Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30.
21.) See Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54 ("To preclude parties from contesting mat-
ters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate ... fosters reliance on
judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.").
211 See Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 133 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir.
1943)("A lawsuit is not a laboratory experiment for the discovery of physical laws
of universal application but a means of settling a dispute between litigants.");
Note, supra note 85, at 593.
212 Cf Currie, supra note 67, at 289 ("Our aversion to the twenty-sixth judgment
as a conclusive adjudication [after twenty-five opposite judgments] stems largely
from the feeling that such a judgment in such a series must be an aberration.").
tice" had been done in the vast majority of cases. On the
other hand, if one of the five aberrational judgments had
occurred in the first action and the remaining courts
barred the defendant from relitigating his liability, then
all subsequent cases would be controlled by, perhaps, an
idiosyncratic judge or jury.2 13 Moreover, such an idiosyn-
cratic decision for the plaintiff is most likely to occur in
the first action since, knowing of potential estoppel effect,
the most sympathetic plaintiff is often put forth first.
Admittedly, trying multiple cases consumes valuable ju-
dicial resources; but, one must consider whether (as in the
present system) the possibility of ninety-five unfair, unjust
judgments is an acceptable cost therefor.1 4 Viewing this
situation as parties with disputes to settle, no reason
stands out why a defendant should be denied access to the
courts merely because he is the target of multiple claims.
Further, with the asymmetry of allowing different plain-
tiffs to estop a common defendant without risk to them-
selves, it is unclear whether the natural consequence of
transferring money from defendants to plaintiffs is sound
judicial policy.215
D. "Full and Fair Chance to Litigate"
The fourth conceptual underpinning of collateral es-
toppel is the notion that a party should not be allowed
more than one full and fair chance to litigate any particu-
lar issue.216 Mutual collateral estoppel comports with due
process in that the estopped party has received notice and
a hearing before being brought to judgment in the first
21' Cf id. "[W]e have no warrant for assuming that the aberrational judgment
will not come as the first in the series. Indeed, [since plaintiffs possess the strate-
gic initiative], the judgment first rendered will be the one least likely to represent
an unprejudiced finding after a full and fair hearing." Id. Currie further observed:
"A case in which the factors exciting sympathy for the plaintiff are very strong may
be brought in a very inconvenient forum, where the opportunity to present an
effective defense is subject to maximum handicaps." Id. at 288.
21. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
'1 See Hornstein, 133 F.2d at 145.
216 See Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967);
Bruszewski, 181 F.2d at 421.
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action. 7 However, whether due process entitles a party
to relitigate an issue against one not a party to the previ-
ous action raises new problems.21 8 Collateral estoppel's
seal of due process approval clearly obtained when the
mutuality rule was in vogue; that is, when the parties in
the subsequent action were identical to the parties in the
original action. 9 In such a situation, fairness permits
only one decision on any particular matter because the
prevailing party merits protection from vexatious and
harassing claims.22 ° When viewed in the light of nonmutu-
ality, however, this reasoning loses some of its luster.22 1
Even though a party has received his minimum due pro-
cess protections, it does not follow ipso facto that he has
been treated "fairly. ' ' 222 A fundamental flaw in the offen-
sive collateral estoppel doctrine is the glaring fact that the
defendant has everything at risk in the first action while
nonparty plaintiffs risk nothing.223 Because due process
requires that all persons have an opportunity to be heard
before their legal claims are extinguished, a defendant
who wins against one plaintiff must still defend all remain-
ing actions.22 4 Thus, nonparty plaintiffs can sit on the
sidelines and watch the initial action without fear of preju-
dice to their positions.2 2 5 If, on the other hand, the first
217 Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 811-12, 122 P.2d at 894. "The requirements of due
process of law forbid the assertion of [collateral estoppel] against a party unless
he was bound by the earlier litigation ..... Id. Justice Traynor then limited the
due process protection: "There is no compelling reason, however, for requiring
that the party asserting the plea of [collateral estoppel] must have been a party, or
in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation." Id.
218 See IB J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.412 (2d ed. 1985);J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 5-9 (1949).
21.. See Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 127.
220 See Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54.
221 See Note, supra note 85, at 593.
222 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31 (stating that "unfairness" to the defendant
may be a sufficient ground upon which to deny offensive collateral estoppel).
223 See Overton, The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral Estoppel, and Conflict of
Laws, 44 TENN. L. REV. 927 (1977).
224 Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 320-28; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41
(1940).
22.1 See Currie, supra note 67, at 287. Professor Currie commented:
[T]he defendant ... is required to defend every suit to the utmost,
risking everything against the chance of winning as to a single claim.
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plaintiff wins, the defendant has, in effect, lost all subse-
quent cases on that issue because he was accorded his one
"full and fair" chance to litigate the matter. 22 6 The re-
maining plaintiffs can then prosecute their actions without
the expense or risk of litigating the estopped issue.227
E. Summary
Considering these arguments in toto, justifications exist
for2281 and against 229 allowing offensive issue preclusion.
The Parklane analysis essentially contains an all-or-noth-
ing presumption for the multiple claimant situation: if the
first plaintiff to judgment wins, all remaining plaintiffs can
utilize the judgment to estop the common defendant, un-
less the court finds either (1) that the remaining plaintiffs
could easily have joined the first action, or (2) that appli-
And how is he to be compensated for the imposition of this perilous
disadvantage? Forsooth, by the experience he gains if he wins the first
suit - an experience which is his under the established rule whether
he wins or loses; an experience which is valueless to him if he loses
the first suit; an experience which is offset, to say the least, by the
"experience" which accrues to the remaining . . . plaintiffs as they
hold back, without risk, and make notes while the case is defended
"to the utmost"; an experience which, at best, is scant protection
against the probability that, sooner or later, some jury in one of the
remaining ... cases will exercise its prerogative to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no matter how ably exper-
ienced counsel conducts the defense.
ld.
•d.226See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 322.
27 Note, supra note 85, at 593. The author noted:
The lawsuit evolved to protect society from the dangers of un-
restricted disputes and still remains a kind of "sublimated, regulated
brawl, a private battle conducted in a court-house." [See J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 5-9 (1949).] The present adversary system is
designed to allow opponents to meet in battle; nonmutuality con-
flicts with this system by allowing a competitor to be declared the
loser to one he has never met on the field of contest. [Spettigue v.
Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 286, 445 P.2d 557, 562 (1968).]
Note, supra note 85, at 593 (citations added).
228 J. BENTHAM, supra note 56; Cox, supra note 56, at 245-47; Comment, Privity
and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 607, 610 (1926).
2211,Overton, supra note 223, at 935; Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mu-
tuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1, 18-19 (1969); Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the
Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 612, 679 (1978); Moore
& Currier, supra note 53, at 301.
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cation of the estoppel would be "unfair. ' 230 Conversely,
if the defendant wins the first action, no subsequent judg-
ment will have an estoppel effect.23' The first case, then,
is important indeed.23 2 Perhaps a rule can be fashioned
that would embrace the best rationale of the mutuality
rule 233 while still allowing offensive preclusion. This rule
should be fashioned to serve the following recognized
goals: (1) fairness to all parties involved;2 34 (2) judicial ef-
ficiency, encouraging fewer trials rather than more;235 (3)
the discouragement of any "wait and see" attitude;236 and
(4) the appearance ofjudicial finality to breed confidence
in our court system. 37
IV. PROPOSAL
I propose this rule:
"A defendant in an action may not be collaterally es-
topped by an adversary upon an issue decided in a prior
action to which the adversary was not a party unless the
adversary had agreed to be bound thereby."
Under the rule, potential plaintiffs will have the oppor-
tunity to decide their own fate. If they wish to rest their
fortunes on another plaintiff's case, they may stipulate as
such. If they wish to prosecute their own claim, they need
.... See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331. Granting collateral estoppel is within the trial
judge's discretion; he is to consider, inter alia, whether the plaintiff could "easily
have joined" the first action. Id.
2.11 Id. at 330.
212 See Note, supra note 85, at 589. "A judgment for the defendant in the first
suit will prevent subsequent plaintiffs from using a later favorable judgment;
...[o]n the other hand, a judgment for the original plaintiff will preclude the
defendant on the issue of liability in all subsequent suits ..... Id.
2"4. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 216-227 and accompanying text; cf Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-
31 (defining as "unfair" application of collateral estoppel in situations: (1) where
subsequent actions were not foreseeable at the time of the first action; (2) where
there is a possibility of inconsistent judgments; or (3) where the defendant has
procedural advantages in the subsequent action).
2-.1 See supra notes 183-209 and accompanying text; see also Bruszewski, 181 F.2d
at 421 ("Both orderliness and reasonable time saving in judicial administration
require that [parties be allowed only one full and fair opportunity to litigate].").
2'1i See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
2.11 See supra notes 210-215 and accompanying text.
not do anything. The plaintiffs, then, will control the liti-
gation and any possible use of estoppel. An analysis of
the already mentioned objectives and justifications for
collateral estoppel will lend support to this proposal.
The proposed rule's most fundamental improvement
over, for example, the Parklane criteria2 3 8 is its recognition
of the unfairness suffered by a defendant who has every-
thing at stake while his opponents risk nothing.2 39 Even
though Parklane, by its terms, instructs courts to refuse to
apply offensive collateral estoppel if such application
would result in unfairness to the defendant, 40 the Park-
lane test does not address the basic asymmetry of risk;
rather, it lists only specific items which may have
prejudiced the defendant in the earlier suit. 24' Forcing
potential plaintiffs to decide whether to be bound by the
initial judgment merely places them on an equal footing
with the defendant.24 2 They are not in any way treated
unfairly; in fact, it is a purely optional decision. Further-
more, plaintiffs will still have an advantage over the com-
mon defendant because they may bind themselves to the
case of a more "attractive" plaintiff, while the defendant
must rely on his own merits in each action. Moreover, the
subsequent plaintiffs are not limited to accepting only the
first action; they may choose any prior plaintiff's case. Of
course, plaintiffs would not applaud this rule since under
the present law they can truly "have their cake and eat it
too." 243 However, requiring a party to submit to funda-
mental notions of fairness should survive criticism.244
Although the proposed rule may still result in inconsis-
tent judgments, the public eye should perceive it as fair.
23H For a discussion of Parklane, see supra notes 111-138 and accompanying text.
39 See Currie, supra note 67, at 287. For a discussion of the Parklane "fairness"
test, see supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
240 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.
241 Id. at 330-31.
242 Cf Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 127 (premising mutuality doctrine on notion that all
litigants should be treated equally).
'4 See supra notes 222-227 and accompanying text.
244 But see Cox, supra note 56.
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The most egregious burden placed upon plaintiffs would
be the prosecution of their individual actions, perhaps the
paradigm of due process rights. With regard to conserving
scarce judicial resources, this rule lies somewhere be-
tween the "inefficiency" of the mutuality rule and the "ef-
ficiency" of freely allowing offensive collateral estoppel.
Thus, while application of the rule would increase docket
size over a system which follows, for example, the Bern-
hard 245 rule, it would do so while achieving basic judicial
equity.2 46 Also, one can presume that at least some of the
plaintiffs will prefer to take advantage of another's supe-
rior strategic position, thus reducing dockets as compared
to a jurisdiction that still follows strict mutuality.247 This
rule, like that of mutuality, would also remove the incen-
tive for plaintiffs merely to sit by the sidelines and wait for
a favorable judgment, a major criticism voiced by the
Court in Parklane.2 48 Aware that he will gain nothing by
waiting, a plaintiff will decide whether or not to prosecute
his own action. If his decision is not to prosecute such an
action, he will then stipulate to another action more
favorable to his position. Thus, rather than dragging out
suits with numerous similarly situated plaintiffs, this rule
may even shorten the length of the entire trial process.
Further, the rule would not cause any administrative bur-
den, requiring only an agreement filed with the common
defendant.24 9
245 Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 811-12, 122 P.2d at 895 (stating the relevant consid-
erations in a nonmutual estoppel decision to be: "Was the issue decided in the
prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? Was
there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?").
246 See Note, supra note 85, at 593; Currie, supra note 67, at 287-88.
247 See Currie, supra note 67, at 288. Presumably, a plaintiff would want to take
advantage of "[a] case in which the factors exciting sympathy for the plaintiff are
very strong [and which is] ... brought in a very inconvenient forum, where the
opportunity to present an effective defense is subject to maximum handicaps."
See id.
2V4 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330.
240 Cf Semmell, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality &Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 1457, 1475 (1968) (proposal of rule for nonmutual collateral estoppel analy-
sis). The agreement would essentially comprise (1) a covenant not to sue exe-
cuted by the plaintiffand (2) a confession ofjudgment by the defendant. The final
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As a final criticism, one could argue that a party de-
serves only one "full and fair" chance to litigate any par-
ticular issue. 250 The validity of this criticism, however, has
drawn differing views. 25  The fact that the defendants in
these cases are frequently large institutional entities which
fail to evoke much public sympathy seems to color the en-
tire estoppel question.252
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of mutuality states that one cannot take
advantage of a judgment by which he had nothing to
lose. 53 Adherence to this rule, however, has been steadily
eroding.25 4 The controversy surrounding mutuality can be
reduced to the simple question of whether denying de-
fendants access to the courts is too high a price to pay for
saving judicial resources.255 The Supreme Court has fash-
ioned a rule which bars offensive nonmutual estoppel
against a defendant if either the plaintiff could easily have
joined in the prior suit or if allowance of the estoppel
would be in a narrow sense "unfair. ' 25 6 The fact that a
plaintiff may take advantage of a judgment in which he
outcome of the matter upon appeal would determine which element of the agree-
ment is activated. If, due to a lack of resources, the actual plaintiff in a suit were
unable to appeal, the remaining nonparty plaintiffs bound to that suit would likely
prosecute the action to its completion.
2 5 See supra notes 216-227 and accompanying text.
25 Compare Bruszewski, 181 F.2d at 421 ("[A] party who has had one fair and full
opportunity to prove a claim and has failed in that effort, should not be permitted
to go to trial on the merits of that claim a second time.") with Note, supra note 85,
at 593 ("A losing party has not had a day in court against the nonparty who estops
him; thus, nonmutuality may inherently violate due process if 'day in court' is
defined as a private contest between parties.").
2-12 See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. Of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.
Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally Gunn, The Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel
In Mass Tort Cases, 52 Miss. L.J. 765 (1982).
253 For a discussion of the doctrine of mutuality, see supra notes 54-138 and
accompanying text.
" See supra note 10.
255 For a discussion of the rationale for discarding the mutuality rule, see supra
notes 182-227 and accompanying text.
250 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-31; see supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
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had nothing at risk is not considered "unfair. ' 257  Al-
lowing collateral estoppel generally saves scarce judicial
resources;258 however, in certain instances the amount of
litigation may actually increase due to a vigorous contest
over the Parklane factors.259 On the other hand, a strict
rule of mutuality, which disallows offensive applications,
discourages plaintiffs from waiting by the sidelines until a
favorable judgment.260 Mutuality as a requirement of col-
lateral estoppel creates a greater chance of achieving a
"just" result in the majority of cases because an idiosyn-
cratic decision has no effect beyond the particular case in
which the decision was rendered.26 ' Most fundamentally,
the mutuality rule places plaintiffs and defendants on an
equal footing, since they risk only one unfavorable judg-
ment in each suit.2 6 2
The proposed rule would allow offensive collateral es-
toppel upon an issue from a prior judgment only if the
plaintiff had agreed to be bound thereby. This rule does
not address situations of defensive issue preclusion be-
cause such preclusion encourages judicial efficiency by re-
moving the incentive to wait. 63 Further, defensive use is
fair to plaintiffs because they have the power to join all
related defendants.2 6 In the offensive context, the rule
would remove the plaintiff's reason to wait for a favorable
judgment and, further, would eliminate at least some po-
tential trials. More particularly, in air crash situations the
'.7 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 327, 330-31. The Court recognized that avoidance
of this asymmetry was the premise of mutuality, but failed to include it in the
Court's proffered rule. See id.
25M See supra notes 183-209 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 203-207 and accompanying text.
21W See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
26, Note, supra note 85, at 594. "Each trial represents a mathematical
probability of an accurate and fair judgment; nonmutual estoppel after the first
trial diminishes the probability of a fair judgment that a party would have been
afforded had he been allowed to relitigate with each adversary." Id.; accord Note,
supra note 229, at 612.
262 Cf Bigelow , 225 U.S. at 127 (espousing notion that all litigants should be
treated equally).
263 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30.
-' See FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
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new rule would displace the trial court's Parklane analysis,
the availability of estoppel being determined by the in-
jured plaintiffs themselves.2 65 Most importantly, the pro-
posal would avoid much of the unfairness inherent in
offensive collateral estoppel because a plaintiff would not
be able to take advantage of a judgment by which he
risked nothing, and a defendant would have the luxury of
the plaintiff being precluded should the defendant win.266
Lastly, the public should perceive the rule as fair because
plaintiffs would still have the right to prosecute their own
actions individually, a right fully comporting with due
process.
2- For a discussion of the proposed rule, see supra notes 238-252 and accompa-
nying text.
-;,; See supra notes 239-249 and accompanying text.
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